Being based on the Ernesto Garzon’s analysis of the authors from the cur- rent of the “nature of the things”, the goal of the present article is to demonstrate that the postulates of this current do not criticize and refute the legal positivism from the epoch but quite on the contrary, they support and even complement it. The similarities between the assumptions uphold by authors from the two currents lead to the conclusion that the theses of the legal positivism and the “nature of the things” streams have never been in firm opposition as previously thought.Resumen:Basado en la exposición de Ernesto Garzón sobre los autores de la llamada “naturaleza de las cosas”, este artículo pretende hacernos ver que las tesis de esta corriente fuera de criticar o de refutar las bases del positivismo jurídico de la época, tal y como pretendían hacer, en realidad, lo soportan y hasta lo complementan. Las similitudes que hay entre las posturas de algunos autores pertenecientes a ambas corrientes, llevan a que el autor niegue que haya existido una disputa “real” entre ambas tesis.Basado en la exposición de Ernesto Garzón sobre los autores de la llamada “naturaleza de las cosas”, este artículo pretende hacernos ver que las tesis de esta corriente fuera de criticar o de refutar las bases del positivismo jurídico de la época, tal y como pretendían hacer, en realidad, lo soportan y hasta lo complementan. Las similitudes que hay entre las posturas de algunos autores pertenecientes a ambas corrientes, llevan a que el autor niegue que haya existido una disputa “real” entre ambas tesis.Abstract:Being based on the Ernesto Garzon’s analysis of the authors from the cur- rent of the “nature of the things”, the goal of the present article is to demonstrate that the postulates of this current do not criticize and refute the legal positivism from the epoch but quite on the contrary, they support and even complement it. The similarities between the assumptions uphold by authors from the two currents lead to the conclusion that the theses of the legal positivism and the “nature of the things” streams have never been in firm opposition as previously thought.

Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM