Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

CreatorFleming, James E.
Date2017-03-17
Date Accessioned2025-05-29T19:23:47Z
Date Available2025-05-29T19:23:47Z
URL de acceso al recursohttps://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/11067
URL de acceso al recurso10.22201/iij.24487937e.2017.11.11067
Identifier (URI)http://revistas.suiiurisasociacion.com/xmlui/handle/123456789/18860
DescriptionIn my recent book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I put forward a sustained critique of originalism in all its forms and defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral reading” of the U. S. Constitution and what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. In this essay for the UNAM symposium on the book, I reply to five thoughtful commentaries. First, as against Barber’s commentary, I justify responding to the “persistent resurgence of originalism” and attempting to “save the new originalists from themselves” by showing the extent to which many of them acknowledge the need to make moral judgments in constitutional interpretation. Second, in appreciation of Imer Flores’s commentary, I draw a distinction between being a systematic moral reader and acknowledging the need to make normative judgments in constitutional interpretation. Third, I resist Ken Kersch’s interpretation and criticism of my project as “calling the fight” for “aspirationalism” over “historicism”—I mean instead to argue for the superiority of moral readings (which combine what he calls “aspirationalism” or justification and “historicism” or fit) over originalisms. Fourth, I embrace Linda McClain’s careful analysis of originalisms versus moral readings in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), protecting the fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples, as confirming my argument that “inclusive originalism” includes practically everything that a moral reader would be likely to argue for. Finally, in response to Lawrence Sager, I bring out the affinities between his well-known “justice-seeking” constitutional theory and my own moral reading, and I argue that both theories reflect conceptions of fidelity as honoring our aspirational principles, not simply following our historical practices in the manner of conventional originalisms.es-ES
Item Formatapplication/pdf
Item Languageeng
PublisherInstituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAMes-ES
xmlui.metadata.dc.relationhttps://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/11067/13089
RightsDerechos de autor 2017 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Méxicoes-ES
SourceProblema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho; Número 11, enero-diciembre de 2017en-US
SourceProblema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho; Número 11, enero-diciembre de 2017es-ES
Source2448-7937
Source2007-4387
Source10.22201/iij.24487937e.2017.11
SubjectConstitutional interpretationes-ES
Subjectfidelity in constitutional interpretationes-ES
Subjectmoral reading of a Constitutiones-ES
Subjectjustice-seeking constitutional theoryes-ES
Subjectoriginalismes-ES
Subjectprecedentes-ES
TitleFidelity to our Imperfect Constitution: a Response to Five Viewses-ES
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


Ficheros en el ítem

FicherosTamañoFormatoVer

No hay ficheros asociados a este ítem.

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem